Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s Objectivity presents objectivity as a historically formed epistemic virtue sustained through disciplined practices of seeing, representing and judging. The book’s architecture, visible in its contents, moves from an epistemology of the eye to truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, the scientific self, structural objectivity, trained judgement and the passage from representation to presentation. This sequence establishes objectivity as a changing moral and technical regime in which scientific images, atlases and instruments organise what counts as reliable knowledge. The case synthesis emerges in the transition from truth-to-nature to mechanical objectivity: earlier scientific representation privileges expert selection, idealisation and the depiction of typical forms, while later mechanical objectivity elevates photography, automatic inscription and self-surveillance as practices of restraint. The later emphasis on trained judgement enriches this genealogy by showing how scientific accuracy also depends upon cultivated discernment, practical expertise and responsible interpretation. Objectivity therefore appears as a history of scientific personae: the observer learns when to intervene, when to withhold intervention, and how to convert perception into communicable evidence. The definitive implication is that scientific knowledge rests on epistemic virtues embedded in instruments, images, habits of attention and collective standards. Daston and Galison thus offer a powerful account of objectivity as a practice of disciplined vision, historically renewed through the evolving relation between knower, image and world.